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Plasticity and Aesthetic Identity;
or, Why We Need a Spinozist Aesthetics
Tom Sparrow
abstract  This essay defends the view that, as embodied, our identities are 
necessarily dependent on the aesthetic environment. Toward this end, it ex-
amines the renewal of the concept of sensation (aisthesis) in phenomenology, 
but then concludes that the methodology and metaphysics of phenomenology 
must be abandoned in favor of an ontology that sees corporeal identity as 
generated by the materiality of aesthetic relations. It is suggested that such an 
ontology is available in the work of Spinoza, which helps break down the natu-
ral/artificial and human/nonhuman distinctions, and can thereby engender an 
environmental ethics grounded in aesthetic relations. An explication of body/
world dependence is provided via the concept of plasticity and a properly 
Spinozist aesthetics is invoked, but remains to be worked out.
keywords Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Spinoza, phenomenology, body, em-
bodiment, space, plasticity 
The general conditions of esthetic form […] are objective in the sense of be-
longing to the world of physical materials and energies: while the latter do not 
suffice for an esthetic experience, they are a sine qua non of its existence.
– John Dewey, Art As Experience
Introduction: Sensation and Identity
Among those interested in the history of phenomenology, and the work 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in particular, it is common knowledge that 
the phenomenology of the body articulated in Phenomenology of Per-
ception owes an incredible debt to Edmund Husserl’s second volume of 
Ideas.1 This is the book where Husserl talks at length about the body. 
The themes of bodily kinaesthetics and motility, operative intentional-
ity, pass ive synthesis – distinctly corporeal acts in Merleau-Ponty’s work 
– are all taken up from Husserl’s analyses. Merleau-Ponty’s memorial 
essay “The Philosopher and His Shadow” testifies to this debt. Even the 
theme I take up in this paper, what Merleau-Ponty calls the “ontological 
rehabilitation of the sensible,” is credited to Husserl.2
Despite the depth of his reliance on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty’s inten-
tionality of the body manages to establish a claim that is, at most, dor-
mant in his predecessor’s research into embodiment. This is the claim 
that I am my body. Merleau-Ponty’s original contribution to phenom-
enology, if not philosophy, is “the thesis that I am my body; that I am a 
subjective object or a physical subject.”3 Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal 
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phenomenology aspires to evacuate the interiority of personal identity 
by rendering the interior/exterior distinction false and replacing it in the 
end with the notion of “flesh” (la chair). The flesh is the term he will use 
to denote the essential identity of body and world, and to indicate that 
subject and object, seer and seen are cut from the same cloth. This iden-
tification effectively reduces personal identity to bodily identity. This is, 
to be sure, a complex and non-physical form of identity, one which con-
siders the body to be a complex sensible event, or an “haecceity of Na-
ture.” The notion of haecceity is employed by Deleuze (and Guattari) in a 
number of places, including A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze and Guattari 
describe an haecceity as an “accidental form,” and thereby determine an 
individual body – in cartographic terms – to be “the sum total of the 
material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement 
and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive 
affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude).”4 
While similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding, Merleau-Ponty 
does not quite affirm the accidental character of corporeal form – his 
remains bound to the ends of human projects, and is thus informed by 
the teleology of human perception.
The reduction of personal identity in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy is an extremely rich one: it leaves room for self-awareness, reflec-
tion, and a positive understanding of freedom. This reduced identity is 
constituted at the basic level by intentionality, the body schema, and the 
aggregate of acquired habits that enable the body to cope in the practi-
cal world.5 But it is also constituted by what Merleau-Ponty calls sense 
experience (le sentir) and sensation (sensation), two different but related 
terms at play in his text. It is at this level that the body is animated by its 
“communion”6 with the world, and it is at this level that the body leads its 
“anonymous”7 existence, a life whose phenomena are never presented to 
perception. The body’s anonymous existence is formed by what Merleau-
Ponty calls “a past which has never been present.” This past names the 
preperceptual aesthetic life of the body.8 In the last analysis, however, 
Merleau-Ponty invokes a distinction between the divergent multiplicity 
of sensations and the unifying activity of perception without following 
up on the challenges that such a distinction poses to his “primacy of 
perception” thesis, a thesis that commits him to the view that the conver-
gence of perception, which draws together and tames the “unstable” and 
“alien” events of sensation, takes precedence over sensation’s divergent 
force.9 This is a consequence of his allegiance to the phenomenologi-
cal method, which effectively bypasses (“brackets”) the metaphysics of 
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sensation, or transubstantiates sensation into “hyletic data.”10 It eludes a 
direct confrontation with the materiality of sensation.
It is not surprising that Merleau-Ponty would hesitate to give pride 
of place to sensation in his ontology of the body. Sensation is a term 
endorsed by outdated empiricists and positivists like Ernst Mach,11 and 
phenomenology defines itself in part by its opposition to positivism, be-
haviorism, and the like. The Phenomenology of Perception opens with a 
critique of the concept of sensation, which is summed up when Merleau-
Ponty states that a pure sensation “corresponds to nothing in our ex-
perience.”12 Sensation is always mingled with perception and therefore 
inseparable from the operations of perception described throughout Phe-
nomenology. By championing perception over sensation, Merleau-Ponty 
aims to mark his distance from eliminativist and positivist accounts of 
embodiment, and to render inoperative or derivative the vocabularies of 
competing theories of behavior and embodiment. After his position is es-
tablished, however, Merleau-Ponty will once again take up the question 
of sensation and ask us to see it anew through the lens of perception. In 
a more direct manner, Levinas will make a case for the irreducible affec-
tive significance of sensation.
Now, I will not explore here the methodological and metaphysical 
problems involved in the phenomenological engagement with sensa-
tion, for surely they exist even if the phenomenologist is reluctant to 
thematize them.13 Instead, I want to indicate a few of the positive ways 
that Levinas and Merleau-Ponty help us understand the aesthetic life of 
the body. It seems to me that their philosophies give us a prototypical 
under standing of corporeal plasticity, and make significant contribu-
tions to the rehabilitation of sensation as a viable philosophical concept. 
It is sensation that gives us our material link to the world; it provides a 
means for grounding identity in the environment and understanding 
the ways in which our sensory environments can hinder or promote our 
well-being. A rich conception of the ambivalence of sensation is there-
fore needed to understand the body’s embeddedness in and dependence 
upon the environment, as well as its identity as an aesthetic object. Once 
this conception of sensation is clear, I will briefly outline how it contrib-
utes to environmental ethics.
I take integrity to denote the identity of the body and to emphasize the 
nature of its structure. So, when I use this term I do not mean it in the 
moral sense, but in the sense intended when someone says, “The integ-
rity of the building has been compromised by the earthquake.” Here, the 
analogy between bodies and buildings is drawn deliberately. And this is 
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not just for the sake of analogy, but so I can eventually suggest the re-
ciprocal determination of bodies and buildings. However, I also wish to 
emphasize that a body’s integrity, as well as what I call its plasticity, is not 
entirely determinable by its relations. Plasticity and integrity are inter-
nal to the body qua body as long as it exists as an individual, although the 
duration of its existence as this or that individual (i.e., haecceity) depends 
upon the relations it enters into. Thus, bodies can be regarded as autono-
mous, but this by no means commits us to the view that there is some-
thing about their individuality that is immune to external influence. The 
body’s integrity and plasticity are both capable of being compromised to 
the point of annihilation or irreversible automatism, which amount to 
the same thing. The idea of plasticity helps us think of autonomy beyond 
the freedom/determinism dichotomy by showing that our susceptibility 
to influence is what allows us to acquire a structure upon which to act, 
react to or resist influence.
Before articulating my position on aesthetic identity, I want to say a 
few things, by way of contrast, about Kant’s aesthetics.
Kant’s Aesthetics
The British empiricists who influenced and provoked Kant’s thinking 
were not afraid to speak about sensations and the effect they have on 
our minds. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, of course, spoke like this, as did 
Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson writes that, “Those Ideas which are rais’d 
in the Mind upon the presence of external Objects, and their acting upon 
our Bodys, are call’d Sensations […] We find that the Mind in such Cases 
is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, 
or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state 
fit to be acted upon by the external Object.”14 Despite the fact that he 
refers to them as “ideas” (like Berkeley), Hutcheson ascribes the delivery 
of sensations to external objects (unlike Berkeley). Sensations are objec-
tively given: they are real, not merely epiphenomenal byproducts.
Kant, who was influenced by Hutcheson, holds a parallel view of sen-
sation. Kant writes in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of 
Pure Reason: “The effect of an object on our capacity for [re]presentation, 
insofar as we are affected by the object, is sensation.”15 For Kant, sensa-
tion furnishes the material that the understanding fashions into experi-
ence; but it is never apprehended in its pure manifoldness. Since we 
begin our critical inquiry into the origin of knowledge from organized 
experience, we can only ever work backward to the disorganization of 
sensation. That is, we can only infer that formless sensations are given to 
Plasticity and Aesthetic Identity; or, Why We Need a Spinozist Aesthetics
57
the understanding. This is how the transcendental method works. But if 
sensation, for Kant, is always already worked up into a representation by 
our cognitive faculty, then what allows him to claim that something like 
a pure manifold of sensation actually exists? As Merleau-Ponty points 
out, we never experience anything of the sort. Kant’s picture of cognition 
requires the concept of sensation, or the sensory manifold, to account 
for the content of cognition. But beyond its basic architectonic/formal 
value sensation plays no formative role in the constitution of experience 
or identity; nor does it hold sway over our capacity to constitute experi-
ence.16 In short, Kant’s transcendental aesthetic idealizes sensation and 
thereby severs the link – maintained by his predecessor Baumgarten – 
between the mind and the material world.
There is, of course, a practical purpose to Kant’s Transcendental Aes-
thetic. He ensures that the material world and its volatile multiplicity of 
sensations remain at an infinite remove from the transcendental ego, 
which signifies the locus of personal identity and the seat of human free-
dom. Ontologically, a gap exists between the transcendental subject and 
the world of things. Consequently, the body of the subject is left out of 
Kant’s theory of identity, as Merleau-Ponty does not fail to note in the 
Phenomenology.17 No matter what happens to the body in the physical 
world, the real identity of the subject is untouched; its freedom is quite 
immune to the laws of nature and natural events.18 This means that, as 
Samuel Todes puts it, Kant “has no sense of how practice makes the prac-
titioner.”19 The price Kant must pay for protecting the freedom of the 
subject is that he cannot account for how the material of the practical 
world shapes who we are as individuals.
Angelica Nuzzo has argued that Kant, in fact, does not leave the body 
out of his equation. If we look to the Critique of Judgment, for instance, 
we see the embodied dimension of sensibility highlighted by Kant. The 
experiences of pleasure and displeasure in the face of aesthetic phenom-
ena allow us to “feel ourselves a part of living (i.e., sensible) nature.”20 She 
concludes that “[Kant’s] general aim is to attribute to human sensibility a 
new central place in philosophy, thereby steering the philosophical focus 
from the metaphysics of a ‘disembodied soul’ to the inquiry into an ‘em-
bodied mind’.” Kant’s modern view of sensibility is broad enough to en-
compass “the entire realm of the sensual: affections, intuition, sensation, 
feeling, and imagination.”21 The innovative moment in Kant arrives when 
he makes of the body a transcendental condition for aesthetics; a condi-
tion that is both “formal” and “ideal,” but at the same time corporeal.
In her recent book, Ideal Embodiment, Nuzzo contends that Kant’s 
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theory of sensibility is ultimately a theory of embodied sensibility and that, 
“Transcendentally, the knowing subject of Kant’s epistemology, the moral 
agent of his pure ethics, and the evaluating subject of his aesthetic theory 
of judgment is a rational embodied being.”22 The transcendental dimen-
sion of embodiment is exemplified in the fact that perception is governed, 
a priori, by a left/right asymmetry, which corresponds to the asymmetry of 
our hands. In short, the a priori form of space (the formal aspect of sen sible 
intuition) has left and right built into it.23 This asymmetry is not merely 
physical: it is a transcendental condition of any possible experience.
I would not dispute the existence of a transcendental embodiment in 
Kant, for Nuzzo’s position is both thorough and compelling. It does not, 
however, succeed in reuniting the body of the subject to the material 
world. In fact, her argument explicitly resists such a reunion. As a result, 
the Kantian subject’s identity remains beyond the reach of other bodies 
and, moreover, those bodies must always be seen as themselves consti-
tuted by the subject’s sensibility and understanding. This entails (1) the 
impossibility of the subject’s identity being either formed or deformed 
by sensation and (2) a reduction of the otherness of the environment.
As everyone knows, Levinas’s entire ethical critique of the history of 
philosophy works against such a reduction. But instead of following that 
line of thinking, I will here discuss the way Levinas’s aesthetics rein-
forces the immanence of subject and object by advocating the consti-
tutive function of sensation.
Proto-Plasticity in Carnal Phenomenology
Perhaps Levinas’s most challenging book is Otherwise than Being, where-
in he undertakes a sustained deconstruction of sensibility which tacitly 
engages and operates against the formal version found in Kant. The aim 
of Levinas’s analysis is to show that, “Even when unformed, or deformed, 
by knowing, sensible intuition can revert to its own meaning.”24 In large 
measure, Levinas’s argument is an attempt to relocate outside the subject 
the origin of the world’s animation. That is, against Kant, he wants us 
to see that experience is animated by the difference introduced by the 
other and not by the synthetic activity of our minds. The relation of our 
“animate body” or “incarnate identity,” as he calls it, “can be understood 
as an exposure to the other, the passivity of the for-the-other in vulner-
ability, which refers to maternity, which sensibility signifies.”25 Sensibil-
ity is neither activity nor mere receptivity of preformed representations: 
sensibility, the site of sensation, is the place at which the identity of the 
world and the identity of my body come to pass.
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Levinas’s account of embodiment in Otherwise than Being ends up 
overstressing the susceptibility of the body in the face of the sensible 
environment. The incarnate subject remains always vulnerable to the 
sensations of the other, its skin invariably exposed to both solicited and 
unsolicited touching. An entire vocabulary testifies to this inescapable 
susceptibility:
Vulnerability, exposure to outrage, to wounding, passivity more passive than 
all patience […] trauma of accusation suffered by a hostage to the point of 
persecution, implicating the identity of the hostage who substitutes himself 
for the others; all this is the self, a defecting or defeat of the ego’s identity. 
And this, pushed to the limit, is sensibility, sensibility as the subjectivity of 
the subject.26
Levinas shifts sensibility and, by consequence, sensation to the center 
of our thinking about identity. The skin acts as the edge or boundary 
between subject and world (although this distinction may be simply ver-
bal). As Rudolf Bernet explains,
Even a tight and thick skin has small and large holes that one can adequate-
ly call “openings.” There are natural openings as well as artificial or forced 
openings called “wounds.” Natural openings are still subject, however, to be-
ing forced and wounded. The natural openings allowing for a passage and 
exchange between the inside and the outside of a body cannot prevent the 
violence of a traumatic intrusion or expulsion.27
The collapsing of subject and object, inside and outside, into the oper-
ations of sensibility effectuates a perpetual “breakup of identity”28 by 
turning identity into little more than an event of sensibility. The con-
stancy of sensation and our inability to cease the influx of sensible ma-
terial puts us constantly at risk of having our familiar experiences dis-
figured, our bodies disabled. This, I think, is what Deleuze has in mind 
when he writes in his book on Francis Bacon that “sensation is the mas-
ter of deformations, the agent of bodily deformations.”29 That sensation 
animates us, rather than us animating it, is what Deleuze calls the “logic 
of sensation.” Here, I think, he is remarkably close to Levinas.
Although in the final analysis vulnerability is the defining feature of 
sensibility for Levinas, it is also a site of what he calls alimentation. Sen-
sations are not only what threaten to break up identities, they are also 
what nourish identities. Our bodies metabolize sensations and thereby 
incorporate them into their constitution. Conversely, bodies excrete sen-
sations back into the environment. Bodies soak up and radiate aesthetics. 
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Just as there is a vocabulary of susceptibility in Levinas’s later work, there 
is a whole vocabulary of alimentation to be found, especially, in Totality 
and Infinity. This vocabulary includes the notions of living from. . ., enjoy-
ment, fecundity, satisfaction, and habitation. The consumption of food is 
merely the most common notion of alimentation: Levinas uses it as a gen-
eral term for the process of identity constitution. Love, joy, and work for 
Levinas nourish us just as much as bread or water. The alimentary is nour-
ishment and a source of enjoyment, and it is precisely our enjoyment, or 
affectivity more generally, which effects our separation from undifferenti-
ated existence – being qua being, the sensible as such – and makes us ec-
static,30 autonomous agents. Our affective life enacts the principle of our 
individuation, makes us practitioners, in Todes’s words. Levinas writes:
One does not only exist one’s pain or one’s joy; one exists from pains and joys. 
Enjoyment is precisely this way the act nourishes itself with its own activity. To 
live from bread is therefore neither to represent bread to oneself nor to act on 
it nor to act by means of it. To be sure, it is necessary to earn one’s bread, and 
it is necessary to nourish oneself in order to earn one’s bread; thus the bread I 
eat is also that with which I earn my bread and my life. But if I eat my bread in 
order to labor and to live, I live from my labor and from my bread.31
In other words, only after we have been affected do we become ani-
mated individuals adept at manipulating things and working toward 
future projects. “Subjectivity,” writes Levinas, “originates in the indepen-
dence and sovereignty of enjoyment.”32 Perhaps with a critical glance at 
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Levinas here makes affectivity a transcen-
dental condition of practical life.
It must be kept in mind that our affective life is incited by the other, 
nourished by the sensations bestowed upon our sensibility by other 
bodies. Affectivity is not autoaffection, but alimentation:
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into 
the same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recog-
nized as other, recognized […] as sustaining the very act that is directed upon 
it, becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, me. All enjoyment is 
in this sense alimentation.33
The enjoyment we derive from breathing comes from the other; we live 
as individuals because the other is there to inhale and exhale. As Silvia 
Benso has said, the activity of breathing is “an animation [that] does not 
occur at the level of cognition, theory, or intentionality” but “is only poss-
ible at the level of the body, through an incarnation.”34 On this reading, 
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the integral form of the subject is not imposed by the incarnation of a 
soul; it is generated through an exchange of material. It is what Hans 
Jonas has called metabolism: through the metabolic process, the organic 
body trades its matter with the matter of its surroundings. This exchange 
gives rise to a “living form” whose matter is never the same, but which 
nevertheless retains a certain integrity.35 And as with Levinas’s alimenta-
tion, this exchange of material need not be an organic process. Inorganic 
material, even sensations, can provide nourishment for organisms.
Levinas would have us imagine this vitality as an event of genera-
tion that is variously described as a “coiling,” “folding back,” “spiral,” and 
“involution.”36 The language here is meant to denote the immanent con-
stitution of the individual and the event-like structure of the subject’s 
integrity. The subject is produced as an “eddy”37 of affectivity; it main-
tains its integrity as long as its common sources of joy or pain affect it. 
Uncommon, overwhelming, or traumatic affects/sensations threaten to 
form it into something quite different. The substance of the self, then, 
is little more than the viscosity or consistency of its sensuous life; or, a 
finite expression of the sensible.38 I would like to call this kind of sub-
stance plastic in order to call attention to its event-like structure and its 
indeterminate, fluid capacity to take on and release form. I will retrieve 
this Levinasian insight and say more about plasticity below.
There is a complementary, and more familiar, view of embodied sub-
jectivity to be found in Merleau-Ponty. The work of sensation in Merleau-
Ponty’s view is often subsumed into his theory of perception, however. 
He advances a “new status for sensation,” attributing to it a “motor physi-
ognomy” and a “living significance.”39 Sensations are neither mental con-
tent nor sense-data nor stimuli. Sensations are transmitted to the body 
in its dialogue with objects and awaken its sensorium, bringing it to life. 
They are, in a strong sense, its vitality. Lest we conclude that the body is 
at the mercy of the sensible environment, however, he repeatedly refers 
to sensation as a power (puissance) of the body, one that is “synchro-
nized” with the “existential environment.”40 This point is consonant with 
his transactional view of subject/world relations as well as its more radi-
cal expression, the doctrine of the flesh.41 Significantly for my argument, 
this power is determined by the singular array of perspectives that any 
individual body embodies, and the range of corresponding appearances 
that attend this set of perspectives.42 Power is determined by the totality 
of aesthetic experiences a body takes in. As Alphonso Lingis puts it, “The 
sensitive body is the locus of inscription of inner postural axes on exter-
nal visibility and of external visibility on its inner postural diagram.”43 
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Consequently, knowing how precisely my body is determined – or, put 
otherwise, being able to locate my longitude and latitude – is my free-
dom and my power. This know-how Merleau-Ponty calls “praktognosia,” 
which is a kind of perceptual and practical competence.44 This is entailed 
in Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “consciousness is in the first place not a 
matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’.”45 This I take to be a Spinozist sen-
timent, with the difference that for Merleau-Ponty it is the habituated 
body that knows, not the intellect.
There are a number of places in Merleau-Ponty’s work where he shows 
a commitment to the body’s plasticity, where he understands its integ-
rity as both indefinitely formable and formative. In his discussions of 
the habit body and the body schema, for instance, he clearly wants us to 
regard the body’s identity as dialogically constituted and open-ended. As 
with Levinas, this identity is aggregated and defined by an indeterminate 
capacity to act and be acted upon. He refers to the body at one point in the 
Phenomenology as “a mosaic of sensations” with “no specific direction.”46 
This indeterminacy is marked by a threshold, or the absence of a specific 
locus of identity. Not unlike Hume’s stageless theatre of personal identity, 
Berkeley’s Lockean definition of the object as a collection of qualities,47 or 
the Levinasian subject outlined above, Merleau-Ponty’s mosaic body has 
no immutable core. It is, in short, “a fold, which has been made and which 
can be unmade.”48 What Deleuze writes about Hume applies for the most 
part to Merleau-Ponty: “The place is not different from what takes place 
in it; the representation does not take place in a subject.”49
No one will deny that there are numerous incompatibilities between 
the authors referenced in the last paragraph. Nevertheless, they display 
a common commitment to thinking the insubstantiality of the subject 
(or the object, in Berkeley’s case), without allowing this subject to be 
completely dispersed into an impersonal field of forces. This effort I 
take to be commensurate with the theory of plastic subjectivity. The 
plastic subject is a dispositional subject, transitory and mutable. Its 
disposition is informed by its sensory environments and discernible 
by the sensations it can endure and produce at any given moment. If 
the identity of the body is marked by a threshold for Merleau-Ponty 
– a threshold for practical action dictated by the existential environ-
ment, the body’s habits, and the appearances delimiting its singular 
perspective – I take this threshold to be plastic in the sense William 
James intends when he defines plasticity as “the possession of a struc-
ture weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to 
yield all at once.”50 Under this definition, corporeal integrity is a mat-
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ter of degree and is never precisely fixed. Integrity will be reinforced 
or compromised by the aesthetic environment and the entire range of 
sensory encounters it engenders, from personal communication device 
interfaces to urban greenways, from airport terminal acoustics to the 
building materials and lighting of Kiasma in Helsinki.
The threshold of identity is explored at length in Merleau-Ponty’s 
treatment of painting, particularly the work of Cézanne. He explicitly 
draws an analogy between the body and the work of art, which enables 
us to understand what he takes corporeal identity to be.51 “For each ob-
ject,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “as for each picture in an art gallery, there is 
an optimum distance from which it requires to be seen.”52 Between the 
body and the work of art there lies a privileged perceptual position that 
reveals the true identity of the work. This position allows me to “identify 
the object [or painting] in all its positions, at all distances, in all appear-
ances, insofar as all the perspectives converge towards the perception 
which I obtain at a certain distance and with a certain typical orienta-
tion.”53 Of course, the position at which a painting’s identity appears is 
not exact, but variable to a degree. This variability, however, can devolve 
into the obliteration of the painting’s identity. Move too far away from 
the painting and you lose clarity. At the extreme, it disappears complete-
ly from sight. The identity of a work of art is thus determined by an “ideal 
limit,” a threshold that determines how close is too close and how far is 
too far for perceiving it. This ideal limit is what is studied in Cézanne’s 
painting, which is why his objects often appear on the verge of losing 
their integrity.54 If the body is like a work of art, a mosaic in particular, 
then its integrity will admit of a set of limits beyond which it ceases to 
be this body and becomes another body altogether. There will be no sub-
stantial core underlying its aesthetic variation; within that set of limits it 
will retain its integrity (or form or clarity), even if some components are 
added or removed.55 This is what it means to be a plastic body.
Nourishing Spaces
Now, if the integrity of the body depends on the aggregate of sensations 
it receives, then the spaces it inhabits (to take just one example of an 
aesthetic environment) are an essential constituent of its identity. Spaces, 
too – whether natural or built – offer a source of alimentation, their own 
unique sensory mosaic. Presumably we want to cultivate spaces that en-
able, rather than disable, our bodies. In the case of built spaces, we want 
their integrity to at least reinforce and, ideally, promote or augment our 
integrity.56 An architectural philosophy whose buildings seek primarily to 
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adapt to the human body, or which takes the reality of space to be a prod-
uct of intentional perceptual syntheses, is inadequate from an ecological 
perspective, and not least of all because it is anthropocentric. Further, we 
want to avoid habitats that compromise us by pushing the tolerance of 
our plasticity beyond its breaking point. From the standpoint of plasticity, 
this breakage is the very meaning of death. We will then want to multiply 
the habitats that increase our capacity to affect and be affected, that is, 
increase our power to exist. For this to occur, environmental aesthetics 
and architecture must confront the plasticity of the body. Can a phenom-
enological aesthetics accomplish this? Not if it neglects the materiality of 
sensation.
Ed Casey, following Merleau-Ponty (and implicitly Bourdieu), defines 
a habitat as a familiar kinaesthetic situation, one which gives rise to a 
practical aptitude required for orienting oneself in the environment. 
In a habitat, he writes, “we can be ‘ethical’ in the originary sense of the 
word, which implies a community of like-minded (but not necessarily 
like-bodied) creatures.”57 Habitats sustain us and offer us the opportunity 
to cultivate ourselves as long as we are willing and able to meet their 
demands. When we do, they enable in us a certain set of dispositions 
for action. This “power of orientation,” or habitus, dictates what we can 
and cannot do.58 Insofar as a habitus is the internalization of a habitat, 
the structure of the body exemplifies and expresses the structure of the 
habitat. And this is not because the body is flexible or adaptable, but 
because it is plastic: it can fashion its habitat, and therefore its habitus, 
just as much as it is fashioned by it.59 A neglect or careless cultivation of 
the habitat risks violating its integrity and, consequently, endangering 
that of our bodies.
Architectural theorists attuned to the phenomenology of the body fore-
ground the body’s reflection of its environment. Peter Zumthor speaks 
of the “atmosphere” of built spaces and how our “emotional sensibility,” 
rather than our sense perception or judgment, apprehends it.60 Architec-
ture, for Zumthor, is about how atmosphere embraces the bodies dwell-
ing within it. He writes:
It’s like our own bodies with their anatomy and things we can’t see and skin 
covering us – that’s what architecture means to me and that’s how I try to think 
about it. As a bodily mass, a membrane, a fabric, a kind of covering, cloth, vel-
vet, silk, all around me. The body! Not the idea of the body – the body itself! A 
body that can touch me.61
In a similar vein, Juhani Pallasmaa writes of how our bodies assume 
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atmospheres in their skeletal and sensory structures. This structure is 
first embodied in the architect, and then transmitted into the body of the 
inhabitants.62 Such a transmission is possible, I would contend, because 
the body is plastic, susceptible to spatial aesthetics but also capable of 
apprehending the power embedded in any space that does not compro-
mise its integrity. The creative aspect of the plastic body is its capacity 
to stylize this power into new buildings that it can then integrate into 
itself. My contention is that these body/building transactions occur first 
and foremost at the impersonal, non-phenomenal level of sensation. 
This level is non-intentional and with “no specific direction,” as Merleau-
Ponty admits. This means that aesthetic design cannot be content with 
the data provided by perception. Perception cannot fully predict how an 
environment will affect the senses; nor can it know which environments 
will enhance the body’s power, or diminish it. In a sense, these events 
will happen by chance. Phenomenology, for all its promise, has trouble 
handling the non-phenomenal and the non-intentional. This is precisely 
because phenomenality and intentionality are fundamental elements 
of its understanding of experience. As Pallasmaa ultimately puts it, “the 
generative force [of the body and the building] lies in the intentions.”63
As if despite their allegiance to phenomenological principles, Levinas 
and Merleau-Ponty make valuable contributions to the rehabilitation of 
sensation as a concept, as we have seen. But these contributions often-
times seem in tension with the first-person perspective of phenomenol-
ogy, assuming instead the form of metaphysical speculation on the gen-
esis of subjectivity and the materiality of the sensible realm. Without 
question, such speculation is required for a complete understanding of 
corporeal identity. Without it we are left only with description. Design, 
architectural and otherwise, needs more than description if it is going to 
realize the unforeseen power of our bodies.
Let me illustrate an earlier point: our habitat is reflected in our hab-
itus. We may recall the habits taken on by Thoreau at Walden Pond. 
Only a certain set of habits were available to him if he desired to be 
shaped by that unique habitat called Walden. A balance had to be struck 
between his efforts at cultivation, on the one hand, and his yielding to 
the environment, on the other, in order to preserve his integrity along 
with Walden’s.64 He could till the land, but not so much that its fertility 
would be diminished. He could last the winter, but only if the season’s 
conditions did not exceed his fortitude. We might imagine Walden and 
consider the unique set of sensations that make up its aesthetic identity, 
as well as the sensations put into that habitat by Thoreau himself.65 It 
Tom Sparrow
66
could be said that, in a strong sense, Thoreau became Walden while 
living there; that Thoreau would not be Thoreau had he not inhabited 
that space. But what would Walden have become if Thoreau failed to 
respect its integrity? Imagine the sensations that would result if the 
threshold separating and uniting Thoreau and Walden were compro-
mised by either of them.
The relation of body and environment is not always harmonious, how-
ever. Indeed, it is often, if not always, volatile. Sensations, as Merleau-
Ponty teaches, are the unstable, the alien. They are alimentary, on the 
one hand, but on the other they threaten always to break us up. Given 
the volatility of sensation and the plasticity of our identities, we need an 
ethical principle that will tell us what kind of environment we should 
endorse. Architect Michael Benedikt offers a useful definition of value to 
accompany the aesthetics of embodiment that we have sketched thus far. 
He says: “‘positive value’ is what we attribute to that which intensifies 
and/or prolongs life. Conversely, ‘negative value’ is what we attribute to 
that which dilutes and/or shortens life.”66 This, again, is a sentiment very 
close to Spinoza.
Benedikt acknowledges the anthropocentrism at work in his defini-
tion, but nothing prevents us from applying it to existence in general. 
The point is to increase power and proliferate the possibilities of ex-
istence wherever we can, whether we are constructing or building or 
restoring or conserving. But whose power? Ideally, any creature capable 
of giving and receiving sensations. Does this exclude inanimate objects? 
Not necessarily, for they too belong to the aesthetic economy and par-
ticipate in the intensification and prolongation of “life” understood as 
an integrated sensory system. The obvious obstacle here is adjudicating 
situations where power needs to be sacrificed in the name of some other 
end, but this problem must be deferred for now.
Spinozist Aesthetics and the Future of Plasticity
It is rare to find two figures more committed to the renewal of sensation 
after Kant than Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. I have tried to indicate some 
of the ways they can enrich our understanding of sensation, but I have 
also raised some concerns about the usefulness of phenomenology’s ap-
proach to embodiment and environmental aesthetics. Its anthropocen-
tric perspective may very well do justice to the richness and complexity 
of human existence, but its descriptions of spatiality and aesthetic ex-
perience must always refer back to the intentionality of the subject. It 
is true that this subject is seen as embedded and situated in a concrete 
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environment, but this concreteness is always informed by the teleologi-
cal practice of the subject. Consequently, the existential features of the 
lifeworld are privileged over the material, and the embodied subject is 
regarded as relatively free to transcend its situation. But an existential 
situation is not a material environment. Their dynamics are different. An 
environmental aesthetics or architectural theory driven by the phenom-
enologist’s picture of embodiment will accommodate the body as lived, 
existential project, but it will do so at the neglect of the material basis of 
aesthetic identity.
Although they are amenable to plasticity, it is not necessary to re-
turn to the phenomenologists to advance the concept. Indeed, I have 
suggested that the metaphysics of phenomenology restricts a complete 
commitment to the plastic body. Nor is it necessary to go to Deleuze, 
or even James, as I have done here, to find the concept at work in the 
history of philosophy. Plasticity is operative in prototypical form in 
most “anti-essentialist” approaches to human nature, embodiment, and 
personal identity. Catherine Malabou has recently found the concept in 
Hegel and taken up research in neuroscience with a view to developing 
a politics of plasticity.67 Neural plasticity has become an indispensable 
idea for contemporary brain scientists; it is the empirical equivalent 
of the plasticity we find in James’s speculative neurology. For my part, 
I would argue that the philosophy of the body we find in Spinoza is 
centered on the concept of plasticity and preferable to the phenomeno-
logical body for several reasons.
First, Spinoza’s monistic ontology considers bodies as expressions of 
a single substance, rather than as individual loci of perception or con-
sciousness. Human beings hold no privileged position in the constitu-
tion of experience or the environment, which means that they are no 
more capable of transcending the events of the material world than any 
other bodies. This leveling of the field of being to a single plane of nature 
has a democratic edge to it, eliminating the distinction between human 
and nonhuman, natural and artificial, and the hierarchy of beings. Sec-
ond, instead of regarding the immanence of nature as the absence of 
freedom, he shows us how to see our determination as our freedom: 
our power to exist is based on nothing other than the ways we are de-
termined by our material conditions, our precise longitude and latitude. 
Third, consciousness, intentionality, and interiority are left out of the 
picture of embodiment; we must think the body and its embeddedness 
in their materiality alone. Everything the body can do must be accounted 
for in terms of “corporeal surfaces, in terms of rotations, convolutions, 
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inflections, and torsions of the body itself.”68 Reducing the body to its 
surface (immanent) identity obliges us to shift our attention toward its 
aesthetic relations.
For Spinoza, a body is never a pure individual. It is always a com-
posite, an aggregate or ecology of bodies working together as an in-
dividual. Some human bodies in a building or in the street can unite 
to form an individual; several animal and inanimate bodies can unite 
to form an individual; some furniture, paintings, and lighting fixtures 
can unite to form an individual, or they may fail to do so. It all depends 
on how the surfaces affect each other and the effect produced. An indi-
vidual is an ecological, not a perceptual, phenomenon, with an identity 
determined by its singular disposition, that is, its power to affect and 
be affected.69 This formula names the plasticity of the Spinozist body. 
Its power is formally variable, which means that some of the bodies 
in the composite can be substituted or eliminated, as long as the com-
posite’s effect remains intact. From a practical point of view, the body’s 
identity is gleaned by asking, What can the body do? Or, What is its pain 
and pleasure threshold? To answer these questions, we need to know 
which sensations the body can endure and which sensations the body 
can exhibit. This is the task of design teams, whether in the domain 
of art, architecture, virtual environments, or urban planning. If we do 
not know what a body can do, then we must actively pursue, by design, 
the power of the unperceivable and unpredictable. A Dionysian ethic 
of exposure and non-censorship suggests itself: “Dionysus affirms all 
that appears […] and appears in all that is affirmed.”70 A fully worked 
out Spinozist aesthetics can help us embrace this principle.71 Spinoza’s 
philosophy has already had a significant impact on the deep ecology 
movement, and I suspect his contribution to architecture would not 
be insignificant.72 In sum, his promise lies in his plastic conception 
of embodiment, his materialist framework, as well as his democratic 
theory of bodies and environmental relations.73 His philosophy affirms 
the equality of bodies, the advantage of cultivating convivial ecological 
habits, and an equitable distribution of power, all of which are at stake 
in environmental ethics and political ecology.
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